28th April 1982.
6 Russell winter 1982-83
Russell's letter of 16 The suggestion was made about a month ago that I should address your shade, and reply to a letter you sent me almost twenty-two years ago, when I was living in Paris, a letter dated 16 May 1960. As I recall, I did reply at the time, but since I made the faux pas of referring to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the curt and icy three lines I received in response constituted, of course, the end of any further correspondence. Naturally, I knew that you were opposed, for obvious reasons, to the metamorphosis of the logic-dominated Wittgenstein of the Tractatus into the language-dominated Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. But at the time, I had no idea of the extent to which your lordship would not brook even the faintest suggestion of a possible query on that score. Had I known, for instance, that in March of 1959 you had written to one of your correspondents that "I think Wittgenstein's influence has been wholly bad", I might have responded differently-though it would only have been for reasons of courtesy.
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This brings me back to the response I'm supposed to make to your letter, because it is necessary for me to situate this letter of yours ifit is to have any meaning other than that of being just one more of your innumerable and, of course, masterly obiter dicta flourished around for the benefit of your admirers. If I sent you that paper on the Tractatus it was for a reason, and as soon as I received your letter I realized that you had not understood that reason. I had been working on the Tractatus, on some of Frege's papers and on some of your own early writings since about 1955 or 1956, work which culminated in a fairly lengthy manuscript entitled "La Philosophie du Langage de Frege et de Wittgenstein", which I deposited at the Sorbonne in 1967 as the so-called "these secondaire" for the Doctorat D'Etat. The point of the thesis was an attempt to make sense, philosophically, of a logico-linguistic approach which I had reluctantly come to regard as the only viable approach in philosophy. I say "reluctantly" because I could not really discern what Bradley would have called the philosophical "first principles" of that approach. It will give you some indication of the rapidity with which this provisional adherence of mine evaporated, if I add that in 1970 or 1971 I wrote to the publisher who had tentatively accepted the manuscript, in order to say that I had decided that the entire manuscript was unsatisfactory, and needed reworking from scratch. I had, in fact, come to the conclusion that the whole logico-linguistic approach led nowhere.
So much for the general background to your letter. Let me now briefly describe the more specific background. It would be exceedingly difficult to work on the Tractatus without being fully aware of what you refer to as "... the influence of mathematico-Iogical symbolism upon his [i.e. Wittgenstein's] thinking...." Reading that I was supposed to be underestimating that influence was my first indication of how totally you had misunderstood the paper I sent you. For the point was that it was precisely this "influence of mathematico-Iogical symbolism" which, for me, constituted the problem. Metaphysical problems are not wholly resolvable into such symbolism, and unlike you, Wittgenstein was acutely aware of this. His way of dealing with it, as we all know, was to deny that metaphysics refers to anything real at all: it is simply a matter of signs which stand for nothing; it is something like a "feeling", a feeling of "the mystical"; it raises questions which have no right to be raised ... and so on and so forth.
However, Wittgenstein also realized that the main limit to the reductive enterprise did not lie in those mysterious entities called "sense data" , but in something subjective which is responsible for there being such so-called "sense data". He expressed this limit in the Tractatus by his interpretation of what he called "the metaphysical subject" which he conceived as "not belonging to the world but ... a limit of the world". It was this "metaphysical subject" which seemed to me to raise the need for a metaphysical analysis of Tractatus-stat ements like the one I attempted to analyze, the statement that" ... we make to ourselves pictures of facts ...." When I read your letter I realized that for you, there simply wasn't any problem there at all, that you were quite content to limit yourself (as before) to the mathematico-l ogical mode of thinking applied to language and to sense data, whatever these entities are, and my interest in what you might have to say regarding the metaphysical problems raised by the Tractatus began to wane rather rapidly.
At the time, apart from a paper by Pierre Hadot on Wittgenstein's supposed "negative mysticism", just about nothing had been written on Wittgenstein in France, though there was a good deal of interest in his work. The paper I sent you was a lecture Jean Wahl had asked me to give on Wittgenstein at his College Philosophique , in St. Germain des Pres, and the preoccupation I had was the one I've just indicated rather than a statement of the fairly obvious fact of "the influence of mathematicological symbolism" on Wittgenstein's thinking. As I recall, Miss Ishiguro, who later became a well-known "expert" on the later Wittgenstein whom you disapproved of so greatly, made exactly the same objection as the one you made in your letter. It would be the objection of anyone approaching tlie Tractatus predominantly in terms of "mathematicological symbolism". But was this "mathematico-logical symbolism" really the central concern in Wittgenstein's position? I do not think so.
In your letter you state that Wittgenstein "hated" your introduction to the Tractatus " ... because my introduction expounded the views that he had when he wrote the Tractatus and he had, meantime, forgotten that he ever held such views." Even at the time, I found this explanation most unlikely, since it scarcely fitted in with my analysis of that work. But I did not realize just how disingenuous it was. After all, it was a year after this letter of yours that Wittgenstein's Notebooks were published, and his letters to you were probably beyond the ken of any notion of their future publication. As early as 1915, that is to say seven years before the appearance of the Tractatus, Wittgensteiri had written that "Russell's method in his 'Scientific method of philosophy' is simply a retrogression from the method of physics", a view which is meant to contrast with his own view which he expresed by saying that "the philosopher" should "not occupy himself with questions which do not concern him". The scientism which he implies in your own approach is quite different from his own motivation. His acceptance of "the propositions of science" as being the only valid propositions, and his acceptance of logicism as indicating the structure of "what is the case"-these are acceptances of
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constraint, of limit, and not principles of ultimate reality, as they tend to be in your own approach. And I do not think that you ever made that distinction or worked out its possible implications.
In your introduction, you certainly saw that despite Wittgenstein's assertion that the philosopher should not "concern himself' with questions which are beyond scientific discourse, he nevertheless did concern himself with such questions. But that is as far as you did see. It did not occur to you that that very fact might be the central point of the whole structure of the Tractatus; Wittgenstein's notes for the latter half of 1916 are, I think, eloquent testimony to this central tension which was to give rise to the doctrines of the Tractatus. I will refer to one theme only in these notes. In August of 1916 Wittgenstein wrote: "The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!", and again "The I is not an object." The tradition to which you belong spontaneously interprets such statements as implying a kind of metaphysical self-centrednes s which, of course, allows its adherents to feel virtuously unself-centred when they robustly try to force this "I" into their utterly inadequate categories. At no stage in your development can I conceive of you as regarding the "I" as "deeply mysterious!" and, of course, that is your privilege, since philosophy is a matter of ultimate options. My point is merely to illustrate the obvious difference between the approach in your introduction to the Traetatus and that of the Tractatus itself, which drew its substance from the Notebooks.
But as a matter of fact, you must have known this perfectly well when you wrote me that letter. You, of course, knew of the existence of those notebooks, since Wittgenstein explicitly asked you to publish them after his death which, at the time he wrote you that letter in 1913, he regarded as imminent. You also received letter after letter in which he expressed, constantly and in various ways, a "spiritual torment" which seemed to form something of a counterpart to a philosophy of mathematico-lo gical structure and symbolism. Moreover, you will surely have remembered something of a letter of 3 March 1914, in which he stated that despite his friendship for you there was a total [ganz und gar] It has little to do with your interpretation of the TraClatu s and almost express ly contrad icts the overwh elming importa nce you give to "mathem atico-Io gical symbol ism". But in fact, all this evidenc e concern ing the essentia l and fundam ental difference in approac h between Wittgen stein and yoursel f, was quite clearly express ed by him in his 1920 letter to you about that introdu ction: " ... when I got the German translat ion of the introdu ction, I couldn' t bring myself to have it printed with my work after all. For the fineness of your English style was--o f course--quite lost and what was left was superficiality and misund erstand ing." This has nothing to do with your explanation of why Wittgen stein is suppose d to have "hated" your introdu ction; nor do I detect any tone of hatred, especial ly if one conside rs the previou s sentenc e: "Now, howeve r, you will be angry at what I have to tell you: your introdu ction will n'ot be printed , and in consequ ence neither will my book." It is, of course, conven ient for you to think in terms of Wittgen stein's suppose d "hatred " for your introdu ction because that implicit ly invokes a well-kn own phenom enon (il n'y a que la verite qui blesse) which, in fact, had nothing to do with this situatio n. The tone Wittgen stein uses strikes me as being that of someon e who has simply realized , once and for all, that you just did not underst and what he was getting at. And persona lly, I'm inclined to think that it was just because you realized this that it was you who came to "hate" Wittgen stein's influenc e, describ ing it as "wholly bad", "silly", "nonsen se", and the like. What is at issue here is fundam ental philoso phical options , and your 1960 letters to me are no more than an exceedi ngly minor fall-out of that issue. Most of what you said concern ing the Tractatu s, in this 16 May letter, was so obvious that at first I wonder ed why you had bothere d saying it-unti l it dawned on me that that was all you were saying, and that for you saying the obvious about that work was a substitu te for dealing with its possible metaph ysical implica tions.
In your last paragra ph you tell me that the Tractatu s cannot be understood "except as being ... an attempt to interpre t the relation of logical symbol ism to fact." But the Tractatu s also makes it quite clear that what you are referrin g to as "the relation " must necessa rily pass through what Wittgen stein calls "the metaph ysical subject ". It is that "metap hysical subject " which "compa res" facts to signs, which "makes pictures to itself'. The paper I sent you was an attempt to make some kind of sense of this remark able picture-making or compar ing capacity of this supposed "metap hysical subject ". But here again, you simply did not see the point. I now regard that paper as quite wrong-headed, but not because I had "undere stimate d" the influenc e of mathem atico-Io gical symbol ism Reply to Russell' s letter of 19 60 51 on Wittgen stein's thinkin g, but because I had overest imated its metaph ysical adequac y.
I will end by saying that today all these controv ersies seem to me to be of no more than historic al interes t-whic h is not to deny that history is of extreme importa nce. For reasons which would certainl y mean very little to you-al though in your present mode of existenc e I might be quite wrong about this-I do not think that the real problem s of philoso phy lie in the areas delimite d by the confict between Wittgen stein and yoursel f, or between Wittgen stein and Frege. It seems to me that Wittgen stein, Frege and you represe nt warring factions within a basicall y similar general directio n. And what I'm saying is that the real problem s of philoso phy do not seem to me to adequat ely formula ted or represe nted by that general directio n.
As a sign or symbol of that last stateme nt, I express the hope that you are posthum ously healthy , Yours sincerel y, A. Shalom .
